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Convergence environments and technologies are urgently coming close to our life with various wireless communications and
smart devices in order to provide many benefits such as connectivity, usability, mobility, portability, and flexibility as well as lower
installation and maintenance costs. Convergence has brought important change not only in the way we live but also in the way
we think. It is the progress towards the attempt to create and to evolve new valuable services through the device convergence
and fusion of in-home, oﬃce, and various environments around the personal mobile apparatus. Based on the dynamic trends of
convergence, it is widely argued that the increased requirements on secure and robust connectivity between a variety of mobile
devices and their applications provide us the era of real pervasive computing environment. Thus, in this paper, we present a
novel connectivity architecture using RF4CE-(Radio Frequency for Consumer Electronics-) based wireless zero-configuration and
enhanced key agreement approach. We analyze the security and performance of our proposed approach by the development of the
prototype H/W and the construction of a testbed with CE and mobile devices.
1. Introduction
Nowadays, various smart devices and their applications are
rapidly increasing according to the smart grid environment
based on the interlocking and controlling of in-home smart
appliances. It means that the rapid and explosive increase
of the mobile device like smartphone and tablet PC will
have a big impact on human life more and more. The
enlargement of the mobile devices based on wired and
wireless mobile communication technologies becomes one
of the important factors that brings into various and new
convergence services, and then promotes it. Such recent
trends request the innovative paradigm about the various
convergence services satisfying the individualized desire and
consequently brings into the new converged services and
open media platforms. Open platform convergence services
between devices evolve into D2S (Device-to-Solution) in the
existing D2D (Device-to-Device), and also evolve into M2M
(Machine-to-Machine), that is all things’ convergence, based
on interaction with devices that are not the simple coupling
between device-to-device and device-to-solution [1–4]. As
the convergence technologies of next generation wireless
networks and smart devices are rapidly emerging, secure and
easy connection between various mobile devices has become
a primary concern and a mandatory requirement in order
to ensure dependable, secure communications and simple
connectivity services under mobile and wireless network
environment to end users. In this sense, IEEE 802.15.4
technologies are presented, as one of the representative
convergence connectivity technologies, and favored to be
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Figure 1: RF4CE protocol architecture.
applied to diversified mobile devices and their WPAN
environments. In last March 2009, a principal electronics 4
corp. (Panasonic, Philips, Samsung Electronics, and SONY)
and ZigBee Alliance agreed to found the RF4CE (Radio
Frequency for Consumer Electronics) consortium which is
based on the existing IEEE 802.15.4 radio frequency [5–7].
Thus, the RF4CE standard can be one of the best candidates
to fulfill the requirement for connecting heterogeneous
mobile devices as well as various CE devices. In the security
aspect, the link key generation scheme through exchanging
key seeds is supported between the RF4CE enabled devices
in order to provide reliable communication. However, the
scheme provided by RF4CE standard has a vulnerability
like Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack that key seed value
can be exposed to the third party because the key seed
is exchanged as a plaintext, and a third party can acquire
and masquerade key seeds to generate link encryption
key. Besides, the scheme also has the vulnerability of key
seed retransmission and interception. In case key seeds are
aﬀected by a network attack like DoS (Denial of Service),
additional seed retransmission is required becausemaximum
255 seeds should always be successively reassembled to
generate a link key between nodes for secure communication.
In case of Bluetooth, it has the risk of guessing of a PIN
(Personal Identification Number) and the exposure of a
random number according to a security mode [8, 9].
In this paper, we first address the RF4CE-based zero
configuration in order to provide easy control and contents
sharing for a smart digital home device and applications. We
then propose RF4CE-based enhanced key agreement using
certificate-based mutual authentication to prevent cloned or
comprised devices from joining RF4CE network and two-
phase key seed distribution to provide eﬃcient and robust
key seed exchange.
The first contribution of this paper is that the proposed
zero-configuration approach provides energy eﬃcient, sim-
ple, and easy configurationmethod to various devices during
their connectivity control and data sharing. The second
contribution is that the proposed RF4CE-based enhanced
key agreement protocol provides a device identification and a
forgery prevention using mutual device authentication, and
generates a like encryption key without using all 255 key
seeds which have the possibility of information disclosure
to the third party, and resolves the vulnerability that key
seed information is exposed to the third party by applying
fundamental key seed encryption. Finally, we present a novel
secure and robust connectivity architecture based on RF4CE
for smart devices and applications.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we deal
with the introduction of RF4CE and security issues of the
existing techniques. In Section 3, the proposed approaches
are presented such as the ad hoc and infrastructure con-
figuration and advanced pairing method. In Section 4, the
actual system implementation and experiment are illus-
trated. Discussion about the proposed approach is explained
in Section 5. Finally, we draw a conclusion of this paper in
Section 6.
2. Background
2.1. Overview of RF4CE. The RF4CE of the ZigBee alliance is
one of the defacto WPAN standard technologies determined
in March 2009 by the representative electric home appli-
ances enterprises including Panasonic, Samsung Electronics,
SONY, and Philips in order to prepare for the rapid increas-
ing demand of bidirectional communication and remote
control functionalities in CE market such as TV, home-
theater, set-top box, DVD, and so forth.
As shown in Figure 1, RF4CE has the physical and MAC
layer function of the IEEE 802.15.4 and it replaces the
current IR remote to ZigBee RF4CE remote based on the low
power consumption, nondirectional function including the
LCD back lighting interference avoidance, and bi-directional
communication. In case of the network layer in RF4CE,
it has the light-weight structure in comparison with the
preexistence ZigBee. Generally the RF4CE topology consists
of 2 branch types’ nodes as called a target and controller. The
target node performs the network initiation as the role of
PAN coordinator similar with ZigBee network. In case of a
controller node, it can search the network coordinated by the
target node and request a connection and it generally works
as a remote controller [7, 8].
2.2. Connectivity Security Issues. The use of interoperation
between various consumer electronics, for examples, TV, Set-
top box and DVD players, and portable IT devices such
as mobile terminals and net-book is highly increasing. The
network connectivity among CE and portable IT devices
are strongly needed primarily because they have various
wireless interfaces. Any service on top of the connectivity,
for example, content sharing service between devices is
impossible without easy set up of network connection
between digital devices. Not much easy set up of network
connection is recognized as industry standard. In Wi-Fi
alliance [10], Wireless Protected Setup (WPS) provides easy
set up between AP (Access Point) and IT device with Wi-
Fi interface. By using WPA/WPA2 security module, it near-
automatically configures secure connectivity between IT
device and AP (Access Point) as long as two devices are
certified as Wi-Fi Protected Setup. However, although many
options including PBC (Push Button Configuration) and
PIN (Personal Identification Number) modes are available
for WPS, it is only good for connectivity between AP
and IT device, namely, AP infrastructure mode and does
not support ad hoc mode. A technical working group for
























Figure 2: Overall environment of zero configuration approach.
extension of WPS is hence progressing in Wi-Fi alliance
[10–13].
RF4CE can provide the basic security functionalities
such as frame encryption and data authentication in MAC
layer because it is based on IEEE 802.15.4 specification.
In the network layer of RF4CE, it first generates 128 bits
link encryption key and stores the key in the pairing table
after finishing the pairing process, and then the encryption
key is utilized for secure data transmission. In the process
of distributing the key seeds, it establishes secure channel
between nodes. At this time, a controller and target node first
performs the pairing process, and then checks the security
capability option of the pairing request node. In case the
correspondent node supports the security function, a key
seed distribution process is performed. During the key seed
distribution, the key seed values of the maximum n are
delivered to a controller and then the same secret key is
generated in an end-to-end. At this time, the maximum n
of the transmitted key seed value is 255. In each node, the
key seed value is reassembled through the XOR operation
and then generates the link encryption key [6, 7, 12, 14].
However, the key seed values have the vulnerabilities such
as data interception, masquerading, and denial-of-service
by the third party as well as MITM attack because of
being transmitted to the plaintext state without providing
an encryption or any security functions. Therefore, the key
seed wiretapping bymalicious users should be fundamentally
prevented, and a solution for forgery of seed value itself and
a sequence number of a key seed frame is required, too.
In order to prevent DoS attack, it is necessary to support
tolerant and resilient capability to prepare for interrupting
the normal key seed distribution and secret key generation.
There is the protection method of the key seed value through
an encryption by using a predistributed master key as a
simple solution for solving this problem between nodes.
However, there remains still security issues like a node
capture and distribution the master key safely.
Recently, several researches related to connectivity and
control platform such as universal control, home sensor
service, andmedia processing multimedia platforms. In [15],
the authors presented RF4CE-based remote control frame-
work, however, it does not describe security analysis and
performance analysis to address the proposed architecture’s
superiority. Some researches [16, 17] showed the multimedia
processing platform based on p2p network and PTP/IP. In
addition, sensor network platforms are suggested to show
the applications using various connectivities in [17, 18].
However, such researches cannot provide enough security
aspect and robustness.
3. Proposed Approach
In this section, we present novel connectivity architecture
with zeroconfiguration and advanced pairing approach
based on RF4CE. The zero-configuration approach is
required to provide simple and easy connection between
various Wi-Fi supported devices. And the proposed pairing
scheme is good alternative for complementing the vulnera-
bilities of the existing RF4CE key agreement scheme.
3.1. Ad Hoc and Infrastructure Connection Mode. We first
show the zero-configuration approach supporting Wi-Fi ad
hoc and infrastructure mode. Figure 2 gives an overview
of the proposed RF4CE-based zero-configuration approach.
The proposed approach consists of three representative
devices such as mobile terminal, PC, and TV. It can be
applied to various CE and IT devices supported by RF4CE
and wireless interface like Wi-Fi.
In order to provide zero-configuration functionalities,
each device should have multi-RF (RF4CE and Wireless
interface like Wi-Fi) zero-configuration core modules, and
its application component. In this environment, a mobile
terminal (user) can make a connection between TV and PC
as well as their turning on and oﬀ using RF4CE interface,
and then remote control and contents sharing services can
be provided by simple Wi-Fi zero configuration. In Wi-
Fi zero configuration, the proposed approach can support





















1. Establishing RF4CE connection,
and then sharing zero-configuration information
Ad hoc connection
mode
Figure 3: Ad hoc connection mode in zero configuration approach.
both infrastructure mode based on Access Point and ad
hoc mode connection. The zero-configuration architecture
capabilities can be performed by the distinguished features
of RF4CE such as NLOS (No Line-Of-Sight or field of vision
limitations) feature, bidirectional capability, reliable com-
munications, power consumption, and true interoperability
between vendors’ products. In aspects of our implementa-
tion, we assume that the architecture has RF4CE and Wi-
Fi RF interface. Thus, it can perform energy eﬃcient power
control, Wi-Fi zero configuration and exchanging control
command by RF4CE and high-speed data transmission by
Wi-Fi. The zero-configuration module supports lower layer’s
RF interfaces, zero-configuration component, and RF inter-
face controller. In other words, the zero-configuration core
module performs RF interface control and management,
and zero configuration of Wi-Fi network based on RF4CE
control channel. Application components have a variety of
application service profiles to provide remote control service,
energy eﬃcient power control, and content sharing. If more
application profiles are added on our devices, they can work
with other devices using the same application profile based
on the zero-configuration architecture.
As we already mentioned about two kinds of zero con-
figuration modes, there are two connection modes like AP
and ad hoc for Wi-Fi zero configurations using RF4CE. The
proposed architecture can support ad hoc and Infrastructure
modes when a device requires making a connection with
other devices with Wi-Fi.
Ad hoc connection mode is described in Figure 3. In
ad hoc mode, there is no access point device and only
exist RF4CE-based mobile and CE devices. For explanation,
we assume that there are mobile terminals, PC, and TV
devices. First, a mobile terminal tries to establish RF4CE
network performing device discovery and pairing procedure.
In case of secure communication, secret key seed values can
be shared if each corresponding devices are configured as
security enabled. After constructing RF4CE control channel
like bold line of Figure 3, a mobile terminal distributes ad-
hoc connection information such as private IP, SSID, security
material, XML profile, and so on, to already existing RF4CE
pairs. Each RF4CE connected devices establish Wi-Fi ad-hoc
connection as illustrated in the dotted line of Figure 3.
Infrastructure connection mode is described in Figure 4.
In infrastructure mode, we assume that there exists Wi-Fi
access point device and at least one device has a preconnected
Wi-Fi connectivity. The preexisted Wi-Fi connection is
described as the double-dotted line of Figure 4. The overall
environment is the same as ad hoc connection mode,
however, access point is added. Basically, in infrastructure
mode, the discovery and pairing procedure to establish
RF4CE network is performed as ad hoc mode. RF4CE
control channel is illustrated as the bold line in Figure 4.
During RF4CE network establishment, a user’s mobile
terminal collects an existing Wi-Fi connectivity from the
rest of devices in RF4CE network, and then requests the
Wi-Fi connection information to the device with Wi-Fi
connectivity. After getting Wi-Fi connection information,
the mobile terminal distributes the Wi-Fi information such
as SSID, authentication mode, security key, XML profile, and
so on, to the devices connected by RF4CE. Finally, the device
which received Wi-Fi connection information makes a Wi-Fi
connection, which is illustrated in the dotted line in Figure 4.
If all members in RF4CE network can support security, the
Wi-Fi zero configuration data will be delivered by secure
communication.
3.2. Advanced Pairing. In this section, we propose advanced
pairing approach based on RF4CE key agreement scheme.























1. Existing Wi-Fi connectivity
2. Obtaining AP connection info from PC using RF4CE, and then
sharing the AP connection information between MT and TV
Wi-Fi
AP
Figure 4: Infrastructure connection mode in zero-configuration approach.
We first present a mutual authentication process between
devices entering RF4CE network is performed to provide
enhanced RF4CE key agreement with two-phase key seed
distribution based on a certificate likeMobileWiMAX [1]. In
the device authentication of the IEEE 802.16 standard called
Mobile WiMAX, it prepared for a forgery attack like a cloned
SS by using a certificate applied in the manufacturing process
[19–21]. In other words, we concentrate on the authentica-
tion of the devices itself, however, it can verify whether a
device participating in the RF4CE pairing process is normally
manufactured or not. It also decreases the possibility of a
masquerading attack in which a compromised controller or
target participates in key seed allocation process.
As shown in Figure 5, a controller and target node
providing a certificate each other perform a mutual authen-
tication process before the pairing process starts. First, the
controller receiving the target certificate confirms whether
the certificate is provided from an authenticated target
through the verification process of CA (Certificate Author-
ity) signature, and then the controller delivers its own
certificate, UID (Unique ID) and SEK R (Seed Encryption
Key Random number) values which are used during key seed
distribution. The UID and SEK R is a kind of a random
number selected arbitrarily and they are encrypted by target’s
public key with the signature of a controller after applying
hash-function. The UID value is used as an argument at the
key seed allocation process and the SEK R is used in selecting
a key seed encryption function. In a target side, the target
certificate is verified, and then the UID value, SEK R and
a controller’s signature are decrypted by the target’s private
key. In addition, the target verifies the controller’s signature
to calculate the hash value of UID and SEK R for confirming
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(target device)
Figure 5: Mutual authentication, key parameters.
that the controller is a node requesting a pairing to target
through the hash value and signature verification, and then
it finishes all mutual authentication process.
After finishing mutual authentication process, the pro-
posed connectivity architecture performs two-phase key seed
distribution. Basically, after distributing 255 seed values in
the existing method, these values were performed XOR
operation to generate the link encryption key of 128 bits.
However, the existing method have some problems such as
key seeds are sent to a node as a plaintext and all key seed
values (maximum 255 seeds) should be guaranteed their
successful transmission each time without loss. Therefore,
in this paper, we propose two-phase key seed distribution
approaches called quick and main mode. In case of quick
mode, it can provide DoS resilient capability because it
does not need to send maximum 255 key seeds every time.
And a main mode can provide the confidentiality of the
key seed values using all diﬀerent seed encryption keys.
Current RF4CE standard does not provide any protection
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during key seed distribution, while our protocol provides
the secure protection for the initial key seed distribution.
In the pairing phase (Figure 5), controller device can verify
target’s certificate and obtain the public key of the target.
Anyone who eavesdrop the communication cannot know or
modify SEK R since SEK R is encrypted with accompanying
hashed value. The message from controller device can be
easily authenticated by target’s private key, while previous
methods do not provide the message authentication in this
phase.
First, the proposed quick mode is performed with the
procedure as described in Figure 6. A target node delivers
randomly generated N seeds (N ≤ 255) to the controller.
In each side, the controller and target can select the same
n (n ≤ N) seeds among N seeds, and then they are used
for generating the same link encryption key. In order to
select n seeds, each node utilizes the random selection mask
function which generates a random number with the size of
255 bits using the address and the UID previously shared
in the authentication procedure and IV assignment process,
separately. For example, the bit string of generated 255 bits
becomes a criterion of selecting the nth key seed. In other
words, each 0 or 1 of nth bit can be applied to a simple
masking scheme to decide the transmission of a key seed
value. In addition, we can transmit the only selected n key
seeds by themasking result to a controller as amodified quick
mode. The former quick mode is a key seed distribution
method to provide the tolerance against DoS or intercept
attack in comparison with the existing solution because it
makes it diﬃcult for attackers to know which seeds are used
for key generation. When compared to a maximum 255 key
seed transmissions of the existing key seed distribution, the
modified quick mode is a way to focus on the transmission
eﬃciency because of distributing only selected n key seeds.
Therefore, the quick mode brings the eﬀect of reducing
the computation time since a link encryption key can be
generated by using few numbers of seeds. In addition, there
is the advantage to make diﬃcult for guessing a link key
in case some key seeds are exposed to the third party.
In quick mode (Figure 6), the communication overhead is
reduced to n (≤255) times communications while RF4CE
standard requires 255 times communications. In order to
generate the shared key using quick mode, an adversary
should know n seeds that are randomly selected in 255
seeds. Also, the selection of n seeds needs the shared UID
that is securely transmitted in the pairing phase (Figure 5).
Thus, our protocol provides more eﬃciency in key seed
distribution than current standard without threaten the
security.
In case of the main mode, the proposed main mode
is performed with the procedure as described in Figure 7.
All key seeds up to 255 are transmitted to a node like the
RF4CE standard, however, all seed values are encrypted by
using all diﬀerent SEK (seed encryption key) in order to
solve the problem of key seed distribution as a plaintext.
We can calculate each seed encryption key by following
equations. First, the SEK1 for encrypting the initial key seed
value is derived by (1) using UID, IV, and SEK R of the
mutual authentication procedure as the arguments of FSEK()
function. For the generation of the SEKn, we can use (2) or
(3) with the enumerated SEK R of 254 bits. If the nth bit
of SEK R is 0, the FSEK() function of (2) is applied to make
SEKn of nth key seed value. If not, (3) is used. The distributed
all key seeds are not only encrypted by using all diﬀerent
encryption keys, but also cause more computation and time
cost to guess a SEKi even in case a special key is exposed by
the third party. Thus, the main mode can reduce the threat
of key exposure and forgery due to the key seed transmission
of plaintext status:
SEK1 = FSEK(Addr‖UID‖SEK R),
EncryptedSeed1 = ESEK1(Seed1),
(1)




IF nth bit o f SEK R is 1,
SEKn = FSEK(Addr‖UID‖Seedn−1 + Seedn−2),
EncryptedSeedn = ESEKn(Seedn).
(3)
In main mod (Figure 7), each seed is encrypted using
SEK1,. . ., SEKn. Existing methods have the initial problem
since they use the previously sent seed as the encryption
key. When the first seed is known, all information is
exposed. However, our proposed method uses SEK R for
randomization. Depending on each bit of SEK R, com-
putation of SEKn is decided as in (2) or (3). SEK R is
randomly chosen by the controller device, and transmitted
as encrypted. The probability that an adversary obtains
SEK R is the same as the probability that an adversary
breaks the public key cryptosystem. Since RF4CE is based
on 802.15.4 ZigBee standard, we could consider deploying
existing WSN key distribution methods. However, such
protocols require intermediate entities such as base station,
while our protocol provide the peer-to-peer key exchange
only between controller device and target.
4. Experimental and Implementation Results
4.1. Implementation of Connectivity Architecture. In order to
confirm the feasibility of the proposed zero configuration
and advanced pairing approach in the connectivity archi-
tecture, we implemented the prototype H/W module with
zero configuration and advanced pairing functionalities for
mobile terminal and PC system. As described in the previous
section, the approaches are supported by RF4CE based on
IEEE 802.15.4 for all CE appliances and IT devices. In
order to confirm and evaluate the feasibility of the proposed
RF4CE-based zero-configuration and advanced key agree-
ment system, we fabricated prototypes of RF4CE evaluation
board shown in Figure 8. We implemented the RF4CE zero-
configuration with ad hoc and infrastructure mode, and
the improved RF4CE key agreement protocol with mutual
authentication and two-phase key seed distribution on the
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Figure 6: Key seed distribution-quick mode.
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SEKn =
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Figure 7: Key seed distribution-main mode.
RF4CE test board. In Figure 8, it shows two kinds of RF4CE
prototypes such as upper figure is RF4CE prototype with
MG2455 RF4CE module [20] and lower figure is the layout
of RF4CE prototype board. The specifications of the RF4CE
evaluation board are shown in Table 1. MG2455 consists
of 2.4 GHz RF transceiver, baseband modem, H/W MAC,
8051 MCU, and flash memory. Moreover, it has timer, UART
peripheral, and normal I/O pins. Specifically, the MG2455
provides a few enhanced features as follows: Scalable Data
Rate (250 kbps for ZigBee, 500 kbps and 1Mbps for private
applications), Voice Codec Support, High RF RX/TX Power,
96 KB Embedded Flash Memory for Program Space, and
Power Management Scheme with Deep Sleep Mode Support
(under 1 µA). Thus, we implemented H/W modules with
IEEE 802.15.4 PHY/MAC as various types in order to be
applied to mobile terminal and PC system. Specifically, we
used a small-size model with one-chip solution for a mobile
terminal (e.g., Omnia phone) and a common model with
enough size for multifunctional usage such as ZigBee and
other IEEE 802.15.4-based simple applications (PCI board or
USB board).
Figure 9 is a real mobile phone with connectivity archi-
tecture module in our testbed. In order to make a testbed,
we used Samsung Omnia phone (SCH-M490) and the
prototype module is embedded as a type of small PCB in a
battery case.
Figure 10 is a prototype for PC system and it describes
a variety of a built-in type of the prototype modules. It can
be installed by PCI extension board or USB connecter board
according to the type of PC system. For instance, in case
of note-pc type, the prototype module can be installed as
an USB connection type extension board because it cannot
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Table 1: Specification of RF4CE prototype board.
General features
Board size 30 x 29 [mm2]




96 KB flash memory
8 KB SRAM
Etc. 16Mhz crystal, 12-bit A/D, D/A converter
Frequency range 2400–2483.5 [MHz]
Data rate 250 kbps/500Kbps/1Mbps
Transmit power
0 dBm




28 mA @ RF mode
1uA @ Deep Sleep mode
Power supply 1.5V alkaline battery (x2) (AA Size)
RF connector SMA type RF connector









RF4CE + Wi-Fi With
Zero-configuration
2 (RF4CE) 2 (RF4CE) 447 (Wi-Fi) 97,991.8
Wi-Fi only 2 2 447 98,769.0
Bluetooth + Wi-Fi 2 (BT) 2 (BT) 447 (Wi-Fi) 98,121.0
have a PCI slot like desktop PC. The prototype for PC
system consists of chipcon’s CC2420 as a radio chip (2.4GHz
Frequency, 250Kbps, 0 dBm Output power), TI MSP430 16-
bit RISC architecture with 12-bit A/D, and D/A converter
as a microcontrol unit. Moreover, 116Kb flash memories
and 8Kb RAM is installed as an internal memory and the
board size of core module is 60 × 32mm. Figure 10 presents
various built-in type of the prototype module in PC system.
Figure 10(a) shows that the prototype module is connected
by USB extension board to note-pc. In case of normal
desktop PC, the module is installed by PCI slot as illustrated
in Figure 10(c). During debug and test, it is connected to the
development machine by USB port as shown in Figure 10(b).
4.2. Experimental and Demonstration of Connectivity Archi-
tecture. In this section we constructed two testbed for zero-
configuration approach and advanced pairing approach like
Figures 11(a) and 11(b). First, the testbed of a RF4CE-based
wireless zero-configuration in connectivity architecture for
Smart and Easy Control of CE devices in order to validate the
core functionalities with implemented zero-configuration
modules has been created in our laboratory. As described in
Figure 11(a), the zero-configuration testbed consists of TV
(Samsung LED TV 8000), two Mobile terminals (Samsung
Omnia phone SCH-M490), and Note-PC (Samsung SENS
P50). Each device has RF4CE-based zero-configuration
module and Wi-Fi interface. The two mobile terminals have
the same application, however, it can be work for twofold:
one is only for TV control, the other is for showing contents
sharing controller between TV and PC. Users can control TV
and PC by using their own mobile terminal, remotely and
freely.
On the other hand, the testbed of a simple RF4CE
network for validating the fundamental functionalities of the
proposed enhanced RF4CE key agreement system has been
constructed in our laboratory. As shown in Figure 11(b),
the RF4CE testbed is composed of two PCs as a controller
and target simulator, and the simulators are connected with
RF4CE prototype boards, separately. A discovery or pairing
request packet from a controller node is sent to the target
node, and then it is delivered to the simulator program using
USB interface through UART serial socket. Thus, we can see
that PC simulator is connected to RF4CE devices with USB-
to-Serial interface, and then each node communicates on
IEEE 802.15.4 standard.
5. Discussion of Secure and Reliable
Connectivity Architecture
Based on the proposed zero-configuration approach, we
analyzed energy consumption for contents sharing between
devices using diﬀerent types of wireless technologies, that is,
RF4CE, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth. We applied multimedia con-
tents sharing to them separately. For each of these types, we
measured the amount of energy consumed and Table 2 shows
the comparison results. We retrieved TV status 2 times and a
list of contents in PC 2 times, and then issues a data sharing
command. In order to measure the energy consumption, we
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Table 3: Security analysis and comparisons.
Existing RF4CE Bluetooth Proposed System
Authentication
Feature None ECDH(Mode4) PKC∗.
Storage cost None Max2048 bits Max2048 bits
Computation cost None 3E∗∗ 3E∗∗
Integrity
Feature Packet level Packet level Packet level and quick mode
Storage cost 255∗80 bytes ∗∗∗ ≤255∗80 bytes
Computation cost 255 times ∗∗∗ ≤255 times
Confidentiality
Feature None (Plaintext) None (Plaintext) Main mode
Storage cost None None 128 bits
Computation cost None None <E
∗Public Key Cryptosystem; ∗∗E denotes the exponentiation; ∗∗∗BT does not use key seed distribution scheme.

























































(b) Layout of the prototype and its debugging board
Figure 8: The Prototype of the connectivity architecture.
transmit 1 Mbyte-size content from PC to TV and measure
the amount of energy consumed using the current con-
sumption model in [22]. In the case of zero-configuration
approach, RF4CE works for multimedia system control and
Wi-Fi is used for delivering the content and the same con-
figuration is applied to Bluetooth. But for the case of Wi-Fi,
only Wi-Fi is used for both remote control and data sharing.
Based on this experiment result, we claim that the RF4CE-
based zero-configuration is more suitable to multimedia
system control and contents sharing than the other solutions.
In multimedia communications, energy is mostly con-
sumed while devices exchange data and multimedia com-
munications have not been much used for control. The
age of various converged multimedia services is on its
way and furthermore various hardware devices for these
services are being developed. In light of this, sooner or
later, these services and devices will be common in our
real life and we are going to use a control unit to remotely
control them. As demonstrated in this section, multimedia
control communications in using such various converged
multimedia services also requires a nonnegligible amount of
energy. In this sense, the proposed low-power RF4CE-based
zero-configuration architecture can play a key role delivering
a new device control experience with the users in the new
environment of multimedia converged services
Moreover, we analyze our proposed approach in aspects
of the security of authentication, integrity, confidentiality,
and the cost for computation and communication. We also
analyze the feasibility of our protocol against the known
attacks. And then, we compare our proposed system with
the existing RF4CE key agreement and Bluetooth pairing
process. In Table 3, we tabulate the functional features
between the existing RF4CE, Bluetooth, and the proposed
system according to above-discussed security analysis.
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(a) (b)
Figure 9: Mobile Phone (Omnia) and its embedded prototype module.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 10: Installed zero-configuration modules for PC extension (USB connection and PCI extension).
(i) Authentication. While the existing RF4CE standard does
not consider any authentication method for the pairing and
the key seed distribution, the proposed approach employs the
authentication scheme that is used for the wireless network
standards such as IEEE 802.16. Applying our approach, two
entities in RF4CE communication can mutually authenticate
each other during initial pairing with the preinstalled
certificate issued by CA. Thus, the proposed approach
is secure against not only the unauthorized device from
attaching any authorized devices, but also any malicious
entity from compromising or forging the node. In case of the
Bluetooth, the PIN (Security mode 2, 3) or ECDH (Security
mode 4) are deployed for the mutual authentication. Our
proposed protocol has the additional computation cost
of three exponentiations for supporting PKC (Public Key
Cryptosystem) as same as the ECDH (security mode 4) of
Bluetooth. In case of the computation cost, our proposed
approach has the computation cost of three exponentiations
due to the public key operation in the mutual authentication
procedure. It means the public key operation is prevailed
against other security operations. Thus, the authentication
row in Table 1 only has the computation cost and it shows
the same level of burden compare to the cost of Bluetooth
(mode 4).
(ii) Integrity. Integrity of key seeds shared among the
nodes in RF4CE networks is guaranteed by FCS (Frame
Check Sum) initially supported by RF4CE MAC Frame
and MIC (Message Integrity Code) provided to packet in
Network layer (NWK). Bluetooth also supports similar level
of packet integrity. However, the previous methods could
not guarantee the security against modification or loss of the
key seeds considering the integrity of transmitting max 255
number of key seeds. Instead, the proposed protocol provides
the higher level of integrity than the previous methods by
choosing n number of key seeds randomly from max 255
key seeds in quick mode. Note that we do not consider the
integrity and confidentiality of key seeds of Bluetooth that
does not use the key seed distribution. Thus, the existing
RF4CE support a packet/frame level integrity function by the
standard specification. And the proposed approach decreases
the threat of the packet loss/interception and storage size
(under 255∗80 bytes) by providing selective transmission of
key seeds.
(iii) Confidentiality: The main mode of our proposed proto-
col provides the high level of confidentiality in comparison
with the previous methods that key seeds are transmitted
in plain text during the key seed distribution, since every
key seed is encrypted by diﬀerent keys using 128 bits AES
algorithm. In case of Bluetooth, it still has the vulnerability
that IN RAND for generating Link Key is transmitted in a
plain text in modes 2 and 3.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a novel RF4CE-based zero-
configuration and advanced pairing approach for a novel
connectivity architecture of various CE and IT devices and
applications. Deploying the proposed architecture enable
users to control a variety of devices and share data, and
save the power consumption in comparison with the existing
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(b) Advanced pairing testbed (right)
Figure 11: Testbed setup for the demonstration experiment (TV-Phone-PC).
Wi-Fi-based zero-configurationmethods since RF4CE-based
zero configuration is working on IEEE 802.15.4 standard
technology. In case of advanced pairing, the novel approach
to enhance RF4CE key agreement is presented according
to these recent convergence trends. Our improved key
agreement approach supports the mutual authentication
using RF4CE device certification in order to resolve the threat
of counterfeited or cloned devices. The quick mode of the
proposed key seed distribution increases the possibility of
the secure generation of a link encryption key against the
disclosure to the third party and the DoS attack by providing
the transmission of the selected key seeds. Key selection
information is only shared between the paired nodes. The
main mode solves the vulnerability of plaintext transmission
through encrypting all transmitted seeds with diﬀerent keys.
In order to verify the zero-configuration and advanced
pairing approach in the connectivity architecture, we imple-
mented the prototype’s networking stack and its various
prototypes H/W such as Samsung’s “Omnia” dongle for
a mobile terminal and PC/note-PC side dongles. We pre-
sented the implementation results with various verification
scenarios using Omnia terminal, LED TV, and Note PC.
The experimental scenarios demonstrated that the proposed
architecture enables to construct a simple and easy control
for an eﬃcient smart home network between various devices.
Moreover, we verified the feasibility and compared with
the existing solutions of the proposed approach through
analyzing security of Authentication, Integrity, Confidential-
ity, and Known Attacks. From the various security analysis
and real implementation, we can say that the proposed
RF4CE key agreement approach is more robust than any
other previous schemes and works eﬃciently with RF4CE
nodes. Therefore, to the best of my knowledge, these results
show the potential to bridge the convergence environments
with smart devices and applications to our life using the
proposed connectivity architecture with RF4CE-based Wi-Fi
zero-configuration and advance pairing approach.
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